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Publicity, punishment and protection: the role(s) of adverse 
publicity in consumer policy 
 
Abstract: This article argues that adverse publicity can fulfil two crucial roles in 
consumer protection law and policy. First, it can operate as an effective regulatory 
sanction in its own right; secondly it can play a vital role in helping consumers to exert 
market discipline by making informed choices about suppliers. However, there are 
significant risks to using adverse publicity to achieve these ends and that it is imperative 
that any regulatory regime addresses these. Studying this topic now is particularly 
important for three main reasons. First, there has been widespread recognition that the 
regulatory offence, typically backed up with fines, is not the most effective form of 
sanction. More flexible, targeted and responsive options are required. Secondly, there is 
now ample evidence that regulated information, for example in the form of mandatory 
disclosure, frequently fails to help consumers to make fully informed choices. Finally, 
there are some highly significant very recent examples of enforcers using publicity in 
ways that can be viewed both as a sanction and as an information tool. The need to 
sanction responsively and to bolster consumer sovereignty demonstrates the potential 
for adverse publicity as a tool of consumer protection policy. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The control of information has been a central theme in consumer protection law and 
policy for decades.1 In the panacea of the perfect market, consumers search for 
                                                 
* This research was undertaken under the Arts and Humanities Research Council’s Research Fellowship 
Scheme and I am very grateful to the AHRC for its support. Thanks also to Geraint Howells and Richard Hyde 
for comments on an earlier draft. The usual disclaimer applies. 
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information (which traders are under incentives to provide) and act in accordance with 
their preferences. In so doing, they send signals to traders which provide them with 
incentives to satisfy those preferences. Where they fail to satisfy consumers, traders lose 
custom and are forced either to improve or to exit the market. This is seen as desirable 
both in terms of efficiency and ideology.2 While perfect markets may be conspicuous by 
their absence in practice, and while much economic thinking has moved from its focus on 
the paradigm rational consumer to a more realistic vision, the role and the control of 
information remain central to consumer protection law and policy. 
 
As well as facing discipline by consumers where they fail to meet their expectations, 
traders also face formal sanctions where they breach consumer protection laws. In the 
UK, strict liability criminal offences tempered by due diligence defences have typically 
been used.3 The limitations of such regimes have been examined in detail and efforts are 
underway to create a more effective sanctioning regime.4 One element in the move to 
better regulation has been an emphasis on transparency, both towards the activities of 
firms and of regulators.5 Another has been recognition of the need for responsive and 
flexible enforcement tools which reflect how powers are used in practice.6 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
1 Seminal articles include: H Beales, R Craswell and S Salop ‘The efficient regulation of consumer information’ 
(1981) 24 J Law and Econ 491; WC Whitford ‘The Functions of Disclosure Regulation in Consumer 
Transactions’ (1973) Wisc L Rev 400; G Hadfield, R Howse and MJ Trebilcock ‘Information-Based Principles 
for Rethinking Consumer Protection Policy’ (1998) 21 Journal of Consumer Policy 131. London Economics, 
Consumer Detriment Under Conditions of Imperfect Information (OFT Research Paper 11, August 1997). 
2 See C Fried Contract as Promise: A Theory of Contractual Obligation (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1981) and PS Atiyah “The Liberal Theory of Contract” in PS Atiyah Essays on Contract (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1986) p 121. 
3 See generally P Cartwright Consumer Protection and the Criminal Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001). 
4 Note in particular the Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008 and the Civil Sanctions Pilot 
(LBRO/OFT Civil Sanctions Pilot (OFT 1296, December 2010).  
5 Weil et al use the term “regulatory transparency” to mean “the mandatory disclosure of structured factual 
information by private or public institutions in order to achieve a clear regulatory goal” (D Weil, A Fung, M 
Graham and E Fagotto “The Effectiveness of Regulatory Disclosure Policies” (2006) 25(1) Journal of Policy 
Analysis and Management 155 at 155. In the UK, much emphasis has been placed on the need for enforcement 
authorities to be transparent in their dealings with business. See e.g. P Hampton Reducing Administrative 
Burdens (London: HM Treasury, March 2005). 
6 See in particular R Macrory Regulatory Justice: Making Sanctions Effective (Nov 2006). 
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One approach available to those regulatory authorities charged with protecting 
consumers (described here as enforcers) is to harness publicity, particularly that which 
might be described as negative or adverse, and to use it both as sanction and as a tool 
to inform consumers. This is referred to here as “regulated adverse publicity” (or simply 
‘adverse publicity’ for short). This article examines the use of such adverse publicity to 
achieve both objectives and makes a case for how adverse publicity might best be used 
in future. Studying this now is particularly topical for three main reasons. First, there has 
been widespread recognition that the regulatory offence, typically backed up with fines, 
is not the most effective form of sanction in areas such as consumer protection. More 
flexible, targeted and responsive sanctions are essential.7 Secondly, it has become 
increasingly clear that regulated information, for example in the form of mandatory 
disclosure requirements, typically fails to help consumers to make fully informed 
choices.8 Finally, there are some highly significant very recent examples of authorities 
beginning to use publicity is ways that can be viewed both as a sanction and as a way of 
informing consumers.9 It is vital that lessons are learned if adverse publicity is to avoid 
the dangers and fulfill its potential as a tool of consumer policy. 
 
The article begins by looking at adverse publicity in relation to the aims of sanctioning 
traders, and follows this with an examination of its role in helping consumers to make 
informed decisions. After drawing preliminary conclusions, the article demonstrates how 
adverse publicity may be harnessed to play a vital role as part of a consumer protection 
regime in the context of some highly significant recent initiatives. Finally, conclusions are 
drawn.  
 
PART ONE: ADVERSE PUBLICITY AND SANCTIONING 
Introduction 
                                                 
7 Ibid. 
8 See eg Warning! Too Much Information can Harm (London: Better Regulation Executive/National Consumer 
Council, 2007). 
9 Note in particular the publication of financial complaints data and the introduction of the National Food 
Hygiene Rating Scheme discussed below. 
 5 
 
Adverse publicity may first be viewed as a sanction. Such publicity may be used as a 
formal sanction, for example in the form of public censure, or less formally, such as 
through press releases.10 While this article focuses on (consumer protection) enforcers, it 
should be noted that courts may also use adverse publicity as a sanction, for example by 
imposing a publicity order, and that such publicity may play a role in achieving other 
regulatory objectives, such as environmental protection.11 As will become apparent, 
negative publicity may also emerge from general media coverage, independently of any 
regulatory action. To assess adverse publicity as a sanction, it is helpful to identify the 
principal aims of, and justifications for, such sanctioning.  
  
Deterrence and compliance 
The most obvious aim of sanctioning is to prevent future harm through deterrence. First, 
sanctioning a trader may deter him or her from further wrongdoing (individual 
deterrence). Secondly, that sanction may deter others from similar wrongdoing (general 
deterrence). Where consumer protection offences are concerned, deterrence is, perhaps, 
the most obvious rationale for sanctioning. Wells argues that: ‘[m]ost corporate crime 
theory has been deterrent-based, in the sense that the purpose of instituting sanctions 
has been to discourage violations and encourage good practice.’12 However, deterrence 
does not always operate effectively in the context of consumer protection offences. To 
appreciate this, it is important to think about how a system of optimal deterrence would 
work.  
 
Deterrence and financial factors 
                                                 
10 Although the distinction is an imperfect one. See K Yeung “Is the Use of Informal Adverse Publicity a 
Legitimate Regulatory Compliance Technique?” (paper presented to the Australian Institute of Criminology 
Conference, Current Issues in Regulation: Enforcement and Compliance, Melbourne, 3 September 2002)). The 
problems with informal publicity are also examined by B Fisse and J Braithwaite The Impact of Publicity on 
Corporate Offenders (Albany: State University of New York, 1983) chap 20. 
11 See eg C Abbot “The Regulatory Enforcement of Pollution Control Laws: the Australian Experience” (2005) 
17(2) Journal of Environmental Law 161. 
12 C Wells Corporations and Criminal Responsibility (2nd ed) (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001) p 31. 
See also the symposium “Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior Through Criminal Sanctions” 
(1979) 92 Harv L Rev 1227.   
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Classical economics assumes that rational traders, motivated only by profit, will break 
the law if the anticipated benefits of doing so exceed the anticipated costs. Such traders 
might be referred to as ‘amoral calculators.’13 The trader will comply where pD>U, where 
p is the perceived probability of apprehension and conviction, D is the perceived cost of 
apprehension and conviction, and U is the perceived benefit from contravention.14 An 
enforcer seeking to deter wrongdoing might adopt a deterrence strategy, which involves 
‘detecting violation, determining who is responsible for the violation, and penalising 
violations to deter violations in the future.’15 It has been suggested that unlike other 
wrongdoers, traders act on a calculation of potential costs and benefits. 16 Even those 
less calculating will be concerned to avoid financial loss from enforcement action.  
 
The principal formal penalty for traders is the fine, the effectiveness of which might be 
doubted. Recent research for the OFT found a perception that formal enforcement action 
for consumer protection offences is unlikely and sanctions low.17 Although traders may 
suffer economic loss from enforcement action (such as through remedying a defect, and 
having business interrupted) even without being formally penalised, there is ample 
evidence that current formal sanctions under deter.18  
 
Does adverse publicity deter more effectively than fines? Recently, the Confederation of 
British Industry (CBI) stated that adverse publicity ‘puts peer pressure on those firms 
that have issues to address and threatens adverse impact on their reputation.’19 Recent 
research for the OFT supports this, both for large firms, which might be vulnerable to 
                                                 
13 R Kagan and J Scholz “The “Criminology of the Corporation” and Regulatory Enforcement Strategies” in K 
Hawkins and J. Thomas (eds) Enforcing Regulation (Dordrecht: Kluwer Nijhoff, 1984). 
14 See G Becker “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach” (1968) 76 Jl Pol Econ 169 and A Ogus 
Regulation : Legal Form and Economic Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994)  p 91. 
15 AJ Reiss "Selecting Strategies of Social Control Over Organisational Life" in K Hawkins and J Thomas (eds) 
Enforcing Regulation  (Boston: Kluwer Nijhoff, 1984) pp 23-24. 
16 “Developments in the Law: Corporate Crime” (1978-79) 92 Harvard LR 1227, 1231. See also J Braithwaite 
and G Geis “On Theory and Action for Corporate Crime Control” (1982) 28 Crime and Delinquency 292. 
17 This is in contrast to areas like health and safety law which are likely to be prioritised. See OFT Factors 
affecting compliance with consumer law and the deterrent effect of consumer enforcement Report by IFF 
Research OFT 1228 June 2010 table 3.5. 
18 Macrory above n 6, para E7. 
19 Ibid. 
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adverse publicity from the national media, and for smaller firms trading in localized 
markets where word of mouth could easily damage standing.20 The research found that 
traders fear that existing and potential consumers might be alienated by non-
compliance. Traders admitted that they sometimes changed behavior through fear of 
OFT investigation and prosecution.21 Furthermore, as reputation is relevant to quality of 
products and service as well as to integrity, breaching civil as well as criminal standards 
might lead to loss of business. The research found the threat of adverse publicity to be 
crucial in motivating compliance, noting that that 89% of respondents agreed that: ‘the 
threat of adverse publicity associated with breaching consumer law is as important as 
any financial penalty.’22 Although there is some debate, a range of studies have 
demonstrated that adverse publicity typically impacts negatively upon the performance 
of firms.23  
 
Fisse and Braithwaite identified less direct ways in which adverse publicity harms the 
financial position of a trader.24 For example, where a trader has a poor public image, it 
may be difficult to attract high-quality employees who are able to add value to the 
organisation. Furthermore, a poor image may make it more difficult, and therefore more 
expensive, to raise funds from financial institutions. In addition, traders with a positive 
image may find it easier to have influence. For example, it may be that those traders 
who have a high image will find it easier to influence governments, for example to pass 
or to drop legislation that impacts upon their interests.25 It has even been suggested 
that previous wrongdoing will be treated more leniently where there is a strong 
reputation. Finally, it has been argued that a trader’s prestige has an impact upon its 
                                                 
20 OFT Drivers of compliance and non-compliance with consumer law (A report by Ipsos MORI) OFT 1225a, 
May 2010 para 1.9. 
21  OFT above n 17, para 1.19. 
22Ibid para 1.21 
23 See in particular C Alexander “On the Nature of the Reputational Penalty for Corporate Crime: Evidence” 
(1999) 42 J Law and Econ 489.  
24 Fisse and Braithwaite above n 10, p 248. 
25 A Cowan “Scarlet Letters for Corporations? Punishment by Publicity under the New Sentencing Guidelines” 
(1991-92) 65 S Cal LR 2387 at 2398 
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morale and self-esteem, including those of its employees, with the financial benefits that 
result. 
 
We can therefore conclude that adverse publicity may operate more effectively as a 
deterrent than traditional formal sanctions. However, firms will also wish to avoid 
adverse publicity for other reasons. 
 
Deterrence, compliance and non-financial factors 
A distinction might be drawn between deterrence and compliance. “Deterrence” implies 
that in the absence of the threat of a sanction, traders will decide rationally to engage in 
wrongdoing where that is financially beneficial. But traders may want to comply with the 
law for a range of reasons. First, habit may lead to compliance, Ayres and Braithwaite 
noting that ‘most corporate actors will comply with the law most of the time because it is 
the law’.26 Secondly, there is the symbolism attached to breaches of the law, particularly 
criminal law, which leads firms to try to comply. Ball and Friedman found that the word 
very word crime ‘has symbolic meaning for the public and the criminal law is stained so 
deeply with notions of morality and immorality, public censure and punishment, that 
labelling an act as criminal often has consequences that go far beyond mere 
administrative effectiveness’. They conclude that ‘businessmen abhor the idea of being 
branded a criminal’.27 The language of deterrence might be used here, but compliance 
results in part from a desire to be seen as acting within the law. A number of 
commentators view this as a search for prestige. Rourke suggests that the psychological 
desire to ‘establish and maintain more subtle assets such as respectability and prestige 
in the eyes of the community’ may be strong.28 This respectability and prestige may be 
felt (and lost) by traders as individuals or as part of an organisation. According to 
                                                 
26 I Ayres and J Braithwaite Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1992) p 19. See also C Sunstein Free Markets and Social Justice (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1997) chap two. 
27 Harry Ball and Laurence Friedman “Use of Criminal Sanctions in the Enforcement of Economic Legislation: 
a Sociological View” (1965) 17 Stan L Rev 197 at 216-217.  
28 F Rourke “Law Enforcement Through Publicity” (1956-57) (24) U Chi L Rev 225 at 241. 
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Channon ‘the climate of opinion, and therefore the projection of the company as a moral, 
useful and likeable member of society…[becomes] a direct objective of management…It 
exists in its own right as an operational goal of prime importance.’29 Fisse and 
Braithwaite’s survey of 17 firms that had experienced significant negative publicity 
emphasised both the value to firms of corporate prestige and repute, and the ability of 
adverse publicity to reduce these, something that was beyond the capacity of fines.30 
While concern about the loss of prestige may be based upon economic factors, it may 
run more deeply.31 That traders are deeply concerned about their reputations is 
evidenced by the growth of reputational risk management professionals.32 The use of 
brand image in advertising and the significant efforts of corporations to regain a positive 
image after a disaster further demonstrate the importance of status and image.33  
 
Those traders who comply with the law even when it is economically inefficient are not 
‘amoral calculators’ and may be categorised otherwise, for example as political citizens 
or organisationally incompetent.34 In other contexts, commentators have sought to 
divide up firms into similar categories. For example, when looking at Health and Safety 
at Work, Baldwin divided up employers into the categories of: well intentioned and well 
informed; well intentioned and ill-informed; ill intentioned and ill-informed, and 
problematic.35 The organisationally incompetent are of particular relevance where 
consumer protection is concerned. Many consumer protection offences result from 
organisational failures rather than calculated wrongdoing. Consumer protection 
legislation typically consists of strict liability offences tempered by due diligence 
defences. In practice, many contraventions concern traders who do not have the 
                                                 
29 C Channon “Corporations and the Politics of Perception” (1980) 60 Advertising Quarterly 12, 13. Cited in 
Cowan above n 25, p 2399.  
30 Fisse and Braithwaite above n 10. Yeung correctly notes that the firms in questions endured media disasters 
and that any generalisation from the study should be undertaken with caution.  Yeung above n 10 at 12. 
31 Rourke above n 28 at 241-242 . 
32 Yeung  above n 10, at 12-14. 
33 Wells above  n  12,  p 37. Of course, this desire may also result from the fear of losing business. 
34 Kagan and Scholz, above n 13. 
35 R Baldwin “Why Rules Don’t Work” (1990) 53 MLR 321 at 324.   
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competence to comply.36 While the model of optimal deterrence may not work smoothly 
where non-intentional offences are concerned, it is still possible to think of how 
compliance and deterrence-based sanctioning regimes might operate. Traders need 
incentives not to deliberately break consumer laws, but also to minimize the likelihood 
that they will accidentally break them. Many unintended offences could be avoided if 
further effort and resources were put into organisation, supervision and planning. 
Adverse publicity may provide an incentive for firms to minimize the risk of such 
unintended wrongdoing.  
 
Retribution and just deserts 
Under retributive (sometimes called ‘just deserts’) theories, wrongdoers are sanctioned 
because they deserve to be, not simply because their penalty is likely to have particular 
consequences such as reducing future offending.37 The trader is therefore sanctioned 
irrespective of whether it reforms his character, deters his conduct or sets an example to 
others.38 Although retributive theories are sometimes associated with the political right, 
just deserts is founded on respect for the individual, ensuring that sanctions are fair, 
determinate, and proportionate.39  
 
Adverse publicity might be justified on the basis of retributive theories. We may inform 
the public of wrongdoing in order to reflect traders’ culpability – to ‘name and shame’ 
those who deserve such approbation. Indeed, it has been argued that to secure 
appropriate retribution, any punishment ‘must be public and must attempt to shame the 
wrongdoer.’40 But retributive theories demand proportionality, and because the ‘sting’ of 
adverse publicity is dependent upon the public’s response to it (and may be affected by 
                                                 
36 J Braithwaite Restorative Justice and Responsive Regulation (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002) p 
32. 
37 A. Ashworth “Sentencing” in M. Maguire, R. Morgan and R. Reiner (eds) The Oxford Handbook of 
Criminology (Oxford: OUP, 2nd ed, 1994) pp 1096-1097 
38 Dan D Dobbs “Ending Punishment in Punitive Damages: Deterrence Measured Remedies” (1989) ALA L 
Rev 831 at 844 
39 RA Duff and David Garland A Reader on Punishment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) p 12.  
40 M Galanter and D Luban “Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal Pluralism” (1993) 42 Am U L Rev 
1400 at 1444. 
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how third parties such as the media present the enforcer’s message) its impact is 
inherently unpredictable and potentially disproportionate. This point is developed later. 
As retribution is closely connected to labelling, it is particularly important that any 
adverse publicity accurately reflects the wrongdoing.  
 
Rehabilitation, restoration, restitution and reparation 
Rehabilitative punishment traditionally focuses upon the idea of ‘reformation of the 
offender’s lawbreaking tendencies’.41 To the extent that rehabilitation involves what Duff 
and Garland call ‘a kind of transformation of character in which offenders are turned into 
law-abiding citizens by the application of some generalizable penal technique’ then their 
conclusion that rehabilitation “remains an impossible goal” may seem understandable.42 
However, this may be too pessimistic a conclusion. There are examples of organizations 
making significant internal reforms following the publicising of their wrongdoing, and 
there is some evidence that this may have been accompanied by a genuine re-evaluation 
of the organisation’s culture.43 This demonstrates the fuzzy line between rehabilitation 
and restoration, and it is to this that we now turn. 
 
Much attention has been paid recently to the restorative role of sanctioning. Ashworth 
argues that restorative and reparative theories are not theories of sanctioning or 
punishment as such: ‘[r]ather, their argument is that sentences should move away from 
punishment of the offender towards restitution and reparation, aimed at restoring the 
harm done to the victim and to the community.’44 However, much literature does view 
restoration as an aim of sanctioning.  
 
Where consumer protection is concerned it is helpful to consider two elements of 
restorative theories. First there is restoration as restitution or reparation. Here, a 
                                                 
41 Ashworth above n 37, p 1098. 
42 Duff and Garland above n 39 p 24. 
43 Fisse and Braithwaite above n 10 pp 233-236. 
44 Ashworth above n 37 p 1100. 
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sanction is imposed to correct the damage done. This may be attractive because of the 
belief that consumer protection law does not provide effective consumer redress.45 If a 
sanction leads to consumers being compensated and profits from wrongdoing removed, 
it fulfils an important objective. Adverse publicity may inform consumers of the 
wrongdoing and available remedies, although its threat may also propel traders to offer 
redress. It is closely connected to adverse publicity as information, discussed below.  
 
The second element is restoration as rehabilitation. To the extent that restorative 
theories are concerned with the restoration of offenders, they are ‘based on a 
behavioural premise similar to rehabilitation.’46 Where adverse publicity leads to a 
change of heart as well as practice, it may be characterised either as rehabilitative or 
restorative. Shame may play a role here. According to Curcio, a company guilty of 
wrongdoing ‘may find that to redeem itself, it needs to acknowledge its wrongdoing, 
express remorse, and explain its intention to remedy the problem leading to the 
misconduct.’47 She later suggests that adverse publicity ‘may lead to a ‘collective soul-
searching’ and examination of the reasons the conduct occurred…this re-evaluation 
furthers the rehabilitative goal of punishment.’48 The harnessing of such feelings may be 
achieved, in part, through adverse publicity. However, even in the absence of such soul-
searching, it is possible to see a role for rehabilitation in consumer protection. It was 
noted above that one aim of sanctioning traders is to ensure that they correct errors, 
such as inadequate controls or supervision, which have lead to the commission of an 
offence. This involves a form of rehabilitation, although one that focuses more on deeds 
than on remorse. Adverse publicity may provide an incentive for the firm to put 
measures in place to make such mistakes less likely to occur in future. 
 
                                                 
45 See for example F Cafaggi and Hans-W Micklitz (eds) New Frontiers of Consumer Protection (Antwerp: 
Intersentia, 2009) and W van Boos and M Loos Collective Enforcement of Consumer Law (Groningen: Europa 
Law Publishing, 2007). 
46 Ashworth above n 37 p1100.  
47 AA Curcio “Painful Publicity – an Alternative Punitive Damage Sanction” (1995-6) 45 DePaul L Rev 341, 
380. 
48 Ibid, 382.  See also Cowan, above n 25 at 2401 citing Fisse and Braithwaite above n 10 pp108-109 
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Incapacitation 
The final aim of sanctioning is incapacitation. Curcio argues that incapacitation may 
result from adverse publicity. She suggests that where wrongdoing continues after 
litigation ‘public notification of the wrongdoing would allow market forces to dictate 
whether the conduct needs to change…consumers may not purchase the product or do 
business [with the wrongdoer].’49 However, it is submitted that adverse publicity only 
truly incapacitates the trader in such cases where the withdrawal puts it out of business. 
This will occur only rarely.  
 
When viewed as a sanction, adverse publicity may therefore be justified on a number of 
bases. Most obviously, it may operate as a deterrent, either replacing or supplementing 
other sanctions such as fines. However on appropriate facts it is also possible to justify 
the use of adverse publicity to achieve other goals. One question to consider is how 
adverse publicity enforcement authorities might choose to use adverse publicity (or the 
threat of such publicity) as part of different enforcement strategies in practice. 
 
Adverse publicity and enforcement strategies  
When enforcers are faced with wrongdoing they have a choice about how to proceed, but 
it is clear that that formal action will generally be viewed as a last resort. Legislation 
sometimes requires the first course of action to be informal. For example, regulation 
10(5) of the General Product Safety Regulations 2005 states that in enforcing the 
Regulations, enforcers “shall encourage and promote voluntary action by producers and 
distributors”, although this can be departed from when a product poses a serious risk. In 
addition the statutory Regulators Compliance Code is premised on the need for 
authorities to operate in ways which involve less formal enforcement, and more guidance 
and advice.50 For example, the Code states that: ‘when considering formal enforcement 
                                                 
49 Curcio above n 47, at 383 
50 BERR Regulators Compliance Code (December 2007) para 1.2 
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action, regulators should, where appropriate, discuss the circumstances with those 
suspected of a breach and take these into account when deciding on the best 
approach.’51 It has long been recognized that where consumer protection is concerned, 
enforcers typically adopt what have been named ‘compliance strategies’ which aim ‘to 
secure conformity with law by means of ensuring compliance or by taking action to 
prevent potential law violation without the necessity to detect, process and penalise 
violations.’52 While enforcers historically chose to adopt such strategies, the Regulators 
Compliance Code makes such strategies compulsory. 
 
Although compliance strategies predominate, enforcers will sometimes be able to adopt 
more deterrence-based approaches. The Macrory ‘Penalties Principles’, which underpin 
the Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008, state that sanctions and penalties 
policies should ‘be responsive and consider what is appropriate for the particular 
offender and regulatory issue, which can include punishment and the public stigma that 
should be associated with a criminal conviction.’53 Some regulators, such as the Financial 
Services Authority (FSA) have moved to a more aggressive deterrence-based approach 
to enforcement.54 Responsiveness requires enforcers to impose, or press for, significant 
sanctions where the circumstances merit it. Braithwaite has described responsive 
regulation as involving ‘a presumption in favour of trying restorative justice first, then 
deterrence when that fails, then incapacitation when that fails.’55 Similarly, restorative 
justice emphasises informal techniques such as persuasion which characterise 
compliance strategies, but recognizes that there will be a need to shift from such 
strategies towards deterrence in some circumstances.  
                                                 
51 ibid para 8.2. The Code states that the paragraph does not apply “where immediate action is required to 
prevent or respond to a serious breach or where to do so is likely to defeat the purpose of the proposed 
enforcement action.” 
52 Reiss above n 15 pp 23-24.  
53 Macrory above n 6 executive summary. The Compliance Code requires enforcement authorities to ensure that 
their sanctions and penalties policies are consistent with the Principles. 
54 In championing its emphasis on “credible deterrence”, The FSA’s Chief Executive famously declared that 
firms should be “very frightened” of the FSA. See H Sants “Delivering Intensive Supervisions and Credible 
Deterrence” Speech to Reuters Newsmakers 12 March 2009. 
55 Braithwaite above n 36, p 42. 
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It has been noted that adverse publicity may follow from, or form part of, a formal 
sanction. But such publicity may play an important role in a compliance strategy. An 
enforcer might, for example, suggest that a trader acknowledges wrongdoing as part of 
an informal settlement with consumers. Sometimes, a trader will genuinely reflect on 
conduct, recognise wrongdoing, and publicly acknowledge the need for change. Neither 
requires formal sanctioning powers to be utilised. For example, the RES Act envisages 
that traders will be incentivised to bring contraventions to the attention of enforcers and 
suggest solutions through a procedure of enforceable undertakings. A public 
acknowledgement of wrongdoing may form part of the undertaking. 56 It is also possible 
for enforcers to threaten adverse publicity in the absence of formal enforcement action. 
While it could be argued that such a threat ‘gives enforcers an ace to play’ and that any 
unjust publicity is a ‘relatively trivial problem’, such a view should be treated with 
caution.57 The need to provide procedural safeguards for traders counsels against the 
widespread use of informal publicity without compelling proof of wrongdoing. 
Nevertheless, at different stages of the enforcement process, there may be a role for 
adverse publicity. To understand how enforcement authorities use their powers in 
practice, it is helpful to look at some examples. 
 
Adverse publicity in practice: the Financial Services Authority and the Office of 
Fair Trading 
The Financial Services Authority (FSA) is the UK’s leading regulator of the financial 
services industry, and has consumer protection as one of its statutory objectives.58 The 
FSA will generally publicise enforcement action, such as final notices, and its success in 
obtaining civil remedies, such as injunctions and restitution orders. It will also consider 
making public announcements at key stages of criminal proceedings, while being mindful 
not to prejudice the fairness of any subsequent trial. 
                                                 
56 Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008 Part 3. 
57 Fisse and Braithwaite above n 10 pp 261, 262. 
58 The FSA’s consumer protection functions are to be carried out by a new financial conduct authority. 
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Publicity is generally achieved via the issuing of press releases, and the FSA has noted 
the different functions this performs: ‘When we issue press releases about firms we have 
fined, and the reasons for taking disciplinary action, we are making a statement not only 
about that firm, but also about what we find unacceptable, what we are doing about it, 
and what consumers and firms should be alert to.’59 This illustrates some key purposes 
of publicity. First, by making a statement about the firm, the FSA seeks to ensure 
individual deterrence, as well as to enable the consumer to take appropriate action. 
Secondly, by making clear what it finds unacceptable, and what it is doing, the Authority 
can aim to ensure general deterrence, while also making it clear both to firms and to 
consumers, the standards that it expects. This may also have the effect of raising the 
regulator’s profile. Emphasising what consumers and firms should be alert to will also 
help to achieve these objectives. Some of these points are developed below.  
 
As well as managing the publicity of enforcement action though press releases, the FSA 
can also use public censures as a formal disciplinary tool as an alternative to financial 
penalties.60 The FSA’s Guidance sets out the factors to be considered when deciding 
whether to impose public censure rather than a financial penalty. For example, the first 
factor is whether deterrence can be achieved effectively through a public censure. This is 
discussed further below. A second factor is whether the person has profited from, or 
avoided a loss from, the breach. A third factor is seriousness, with financial penalties 
(generally) being used in more serious cases. Fourth is that where the breach has been 
brought to the attention of the FSA by the person in question, it may make public 
censure more appropriate. Fifth, where the person admits the breach, fully co-operates 
with the FSA and takes steps to ensure that those who lose out receive compensation, 
again this may weigh in favour of merely public censure. Sixth, a poor 
disciplinary/compliance record is likely to point in favour of a financial penalty. The 
                                                 
59 FSA Transparency as a Regulatory Tool (DP/03, May 2008) para 2.14. 
60 Public censure includes a statement published under section 205 and a statement of misconduct published 
under section 66 of FSMA. 
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rationale for this is stated to be deterrence. Seventh, the FSA will look to ensure 
consistency in its approach, by considering previous cases. Finally, the FSA will consider 
the impact upon the person concerned. The factors reveal that public censure alone will 
typically be used in less serious cases, which may appear surprising given the deterrent 
effect of adverse publicity. However, two points should be noted. First, the imposition of 
a financial penalty will not mean that the firm is immune from adverse publicity as this 
will be communicated via a press release. Secondly, the FSA is able (and has shown 
itself willing in appropriate cases) to impose far more significant financial penalties than 
most authorities.61  
 
 
The Office of Fair Trading also uses adverse publicity as part of its enforcement toolkit. 
Like the FSA, the OFT sets out the rationale behind its use of publicity. It states that 
‘wherever possible and appropriate’ the OFT publicises the outcomes of proceedings, 
undertakings, interim measures and orders, taking due account of the need to: ‘Deter 
others from engaging in similar kinds of conduct; warn consumers about practices that 
are detrimental to their interests; increase consumers’ awareness of their rights; 
facilitate complaints about further breaches; and educate other businesses in the 
market.’62 Like the FSA, the OFT will sometimes consider it appropriate to publicise 
investigations at an early stage, particularly if there is evidence that a problem is 
manifesting across a market.63  
 
The OFT has fewer sanctioning tools than the FSA and no formal power of public 
censure. One of its principal powers is to seek undertakings under a variety of consumer 
protection legislation, including the Enterprise Act 2002, and the Consumer Protection 
from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008. Publicising undertakings performs the dual roles 
of securing deterrence and communicating effectively with consumers. The latter is 
                                                 
61 See http://www.fsa.gov.uk for details. 
62 OFT Statement of Consumer Protection Enforcement Principles (OFT 964) December 2008 para 2.23. 
63Ibid. 
 18 
 
particularly important given the nature of undertakings and the need for consumer input 
to help to monitor the conduct of the trader. The OFT will conduct regular reviews of 
trader behaviour in relation to undertakings and orders that have been obtained, but 
relies upon third parties to provide it with information about the extent to which a trader 
continues to comply with an undertaking. This information might come from consumers 
or from bodies such as Consumer Direct. As explained in more detail below, adverse 
publicity may be helpful in alerting consumers to the wrongdoing of particular traders 
and encouraging consumers to report any further breaches.   
 
The OFT regime has come in for some criticism, being described by the OECD as ‘not 
fully formed or agreed.’64 The OFT’s use of publicity is in a sense informal, although the 
existence of a policy reveals the blurring of lines between the formal and informal use of 
adverse publicity.  
 
The examples of the FSA and OFT demonstrate that adverse publicity should not be 
viewed solely in this punitive sense. It also has a role to play in informing consumers and 
facilitating the effective operation of markets. It is to this communicative role of adverse 
publicity that we now turn.  
 
PART TWO: ADVERSE PUBLICITY AS INFORMATION 
 
Adverse publicity as information: market discipline and consumer choice  
Adverse publicity may be viewed as an important information tool, assisting consumers 
in making informed choices and so helping markets to function. In the perfect market of 
economic theory, all players have perfect information about the nature and value of 
goods traded. With that information, they can make informed choices in accordance with 
their preferences. While this is championed by supporters of classical economics on 
                                                 
64 OECD Report on the Effectiveness of Enforcement Regimes (Paris: OECD) 43. 
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grounds of efficiency and autonomy, the value of the paradigm perfect market as a 
framework for analysis is much contested.65 It has long-been recognised that perfect 
markets are conspicuous by their absence. Scholars sympathetic to the market in large 
part accept this, but concentrate their attention on (a) the positive role of the law in 
addressing market failure (for example by correcting information asymmetry) and (b) 
the negative role that other intervention might have in contributing to market failure.66 
By focusing on these issues, scholars could identify how regulation is best designed to 
improve the functioning of the market. Many regulators describe their approaches as 
‘market based’ and some see market failure as the justification for regulation.67 The 
need to correct the information asymmetry that exists between suppliers and consumers 
has been a major, and perhaps the dominant, narrative in consumer law and policy 
across the globe.68 
 
There is now a wealth of evidence that consumers do not play the role traditionally 
ascribed to them by classical economic theory. Many recent studies in behavioural 
economics have challenged traditional assumptions about how consumers make 
decisions.69 For example, it is suggested that: consumers’ preferences vary over time 
(usually with a preference for the short term); they tend to be over-optimistic; they 
respond very differently depending upon how questions are presented, and they tend to 
use heuristics (rules of thumb) to assess factors such as risk.70 These findings counsel 
caution about the extent to which we focus on simply correcting information asymmetry 
                                                 
65 Below n 69. 
66 See e.g. David J Cayne and Michael J Trebilcock “Market Considerations in the Formulation of Consumer 
Protection Policy” (1973) 23 Univ of Tor LJ 396. 
67 The FSA, for example, has stated that “markets can fail and this provides the reason for regulation” FSA 
Reasonable Expectations: Regulation in a non-zero failure world (FSA, September, 2003) para 1.9 (emphasis 
added). 
68 See e.g. G Hadfield, R Howse and M Trebilcock ‘Information-Based Principles for Rethinking Consumer 
Protection Policy’ (1998) 21 Journal of Consumer Policy 131. 
69 The literature is voluminous. See for example C Jolls, CR Sunstein and R Thaler “A Behavioural Approach to 
Law and Economics” (1998) Stan L Rev 1470; J Hansen and D Kysar “Taking Behaviouralism seriously: The 
Problem of Market Manipulation” (1999) 74 NYUL Rev 630. The literature is skilfully summarised and 
discussed in G Howells “The Potential and Limits of Consumer Empowerment by Information” (2005) 32(3) 
JLS 349. 
70 For an excellent summary of these issues see I Ramsay Consumer Law and Policy (Abingdon: Hart 
Publishing, 2nd ed, 2007) pp 71-84. 
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in the hope and expectation that this will lead to consumers’ making informed choices in 
their own interests. Whether we believe that consumers are rational maximisers of their 
own utility, or view them instead as typically displaying cognitive biases, there is broad 
agreement that the information consumers would need to make a fully informed choice 
is likely to be absent from many markets. The reasons for this need not trouble us here, 
and have been examined at length in the literature.71 Our focus is instead on the role 
that adverse publicity might play in improving consumer choice and decision-making.  
 
Adverse publicity may be viewed as a tool to ensure that consumers are informed about 
matters that might affect their decisions. Research suggests that to make informed 
choices, consumers need information about price, quality and terms of trade and that an 
unregulated market may not always provide this.72 Adverse publicity may help to inform 
consumers about the quality of the provider, for example by informing them about 
wrongdoing. Consumer sovereignty is respected, as a consumer for whom the integrity 
or competence of a supplier is important can be informed about that. This helps the 
consumer to exert market discipline. The issuing of press releases about enforcement 
action is traditionally seen as principally part of the sanctioning process, but as the 
examples of the FSA and OFT above demonstrate, they may equally be seen as helping 
consumers to make informed choices.  
 
Adverse publicity as information: beyond breaches of the law? 
The discussion above assumes that the trader has breached the law and that the 
adverse publicity will reflect that. Where a firm breaches the criminal law, it is relatively 
easy to convey this in a press release or similar communication. Similarly, where a 
trader has been is in breach of other clear minimum standards, conveying this will be 
comparatively straight forward. However, if we view adverse publicity through the lens 
of consumer information, we may need to go further. Brooker suggests that ‘consumers 
                                                 
71 See London Economics above n 1. 
72 Ibid. 
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have a right to know when businesses act illegally or perform poorly’ [my italics].73 At 
another point he suggests we might argue that ‘as a matter of principle, consumers have 
a right to know when the behaviour of a business casts serious doubts on its integrity or 
competence.’74 Where illegality and integrity are in issue, it should be relatively straight 
forward to use adverse publicity. How far adverse publicity has a role in informing 
consumers about competence and poor performance in the absence of a breach of 
mandatory standards is more difficult to determine, but demands consideration.  
 
It has been suggested that consumers have expectations of what businesses should 
deliver in a range of areas, such as product design, customer service, financial probity, 
legal compliance and ethical practices.75 Particular difficulties are raised by what might 
be called social or ethical factors.  Communicating negative information about such 
factors is likely to generate, or constitute, adverse publicity. A review of ethical 
consumerism literature and matters deemed by the press to be of concern to consumers 
by one leading study revealed sixteen such social and ethical issues.76 If we accept that 
consumers need information about some such matters to make informed choices, we 
have to identify which to publicise. A second difficulty is that even if we can identify the 
matters of most concern to consumers, using adverse publicity to inform them of which 
firms or products perform poorly on such matters will be problematic. As there is no 
single accepted standard which a firm can be said to have breached, firms may rightly 
object to ‘poor performance’ being conveyed as reprehensible. In particular, adverse 
publicity may not communicate effectively the tradeoffs involved with some apparently 
unethical conduct. For example, some products may involve a substantial carbon 
                                                 
73 S Brooker Regulation and Reputation (London: NCC, 2006) p 7. 
74 Ibid, p 1. 
75 Ibid, p 3. 
76 These were: (1) animal rights in product testing; (2) the use of animal by-products; (3) product 
biodegradability; (4) products made from recyclables; (5) the provision of product safety information; (6) 
human rights; (7) packaging recyclability; (8) product disposability; (9) the payment of minimum wages; (10) 
whether unions are allowed; (11) whether minimum living conditions are met; (12) sexual orientation rights; 
(13) the guarantee of safe working conditions; (14) the use of child labour in production; (15) genetically 
modified material usage; and (16) gender religious and racial rights. (T Devinney, P Auger and G Eckhardt The 
Myth of the Ethical Consumer (Cambridge: CUP, 2010) pp 140-141.  
 22 
 
footprint, but bring important business to impoverished producers. It is not possible 
comprehensively to label many products simply in terms of social or ethical criteria. 
Recent research by the Better Regulation Executive and National Consumer Council 
suggests that authorities should be cautious in their use of regulated information, and 
that the disclosure of complex information is particularly unappealing for consumers.77 It 
found general agreement that ‘information provision that made choices more 
complicated was unlikely to be successful.’78  
 
A third difficulty is that even where consumers say that matters concern them and are 
provided with information about them, it is not clear how far they act upon them. 
Devinney Auger and Eckhardt found that while consumers typically claim significant 
interest in such issues, they generally do not act accordingly, and that ‘providing people 
with information about the social issues did not seem to influence their choice.’79 If this 
is correct, publicizing such matters may be neither effective as a sanction, nor useful in 
improving market discipline.  
 
A final and significant difficulty in relying on adverse publicity to deliver social and ethical 
information is that to the extent that consumers care about ethical and related issues, 
they want to know those players in the market who perform well in addition to those 
who perform poorly. By definition, adverse publicity focuses on the latter. There is an 
argument for any regime that emphasises information and consumer choice to be more 
comprehensive. As will be seen below, there is a welcome movement in regulation 
towards the provision of such information. 
 
Adverse publicity as information: rights redress and feedback 
As well as helping consumers to make informed purchasing choices, adverse publicity 
may also provide useful post contractual information. For example, by publicising details 
                                                 
77 BRE/NCC above, n 8. 
78 Ibid, p 11. 
79 Devinney, Auger and Eckhart above n76, p 116.  
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of wrongdoing, enforcers may help consumers to identify that they have been victims 
and to seek compensation. As Yeung observes, where private enforcement is possible 
‘publicity campaigns directed at regulatory violations may encourage aggrieved 
individuals to mount private enforcement actions, thereby directly contributing to the 
vigour of regulatory enforcement.’80 Publicity may also operate as an enforcement 
feedback mechanism, as consumers are alerted to a trader’s activities and may help 
enforcement authorities to monitor the success of their actions. This will help inform 
whether further regulatory action is desirable.  
 
The RES Act contains a number of provisions which may involve the use of publicity to 
ensure consumers receive redress. Traders are able to offer enforcement undertakings to 
enforcers which involve, in Macrory’s words ‘the potential of imposing fit for purpose 
sanctions which are more satisfying for both offender and victims of non-compliance.’81 
The action that the business can undertake must be: to ensure the offence does not 
continue or recur; to secure that the position is restored (so far as possible) to where it 
would have been without the offence; to pay money to benefit anyone affected by the 
offence; or other actions specified by the minister in the order.82 Where a trader is 
offering to restore a position or pay compensation, it is likely that s/he will also have to 
publicise this in order to bring it to the attention of those affected. The other RES Act 
power of particular relevance is the restoration requirement (an example of what the Act 
calls Discretionary Requirements). Under this provision, an enforcer may give a trader a 
notice which sets out the steps the trader must take to restore the position (so far as 
possible) to where it would have been had the offence not been committed.83 In many 
cases, this will involve publicising the original wrongdoing and the redress or similar 
                                                 
80 Yeung above n 10, at 18. 
81 Macrory above n 6,  para 4.18. Macrory referred to the powers as enforceable undertakings in his report. 
82 BERR Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008 Guidance to the Act (July 2008) para 60. See RES 
Act s.50. 
83 RES Act s.42(3)(c). 
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corrective action available. A two year Pilot will test the utility of applying RES Act 
powers in consumer protection.84  
 
Adverse publicity as information: standard setting and education 
Adverse publicity might be justified as a method of communicating to firms and 
consumers what is expected of the former. Because they frequently lack understanding 
of consumer law, traders sometimes apply a ‘spirit of the law’ or ‘common sense’ test 
rather than one based on legal requirements.85 There is nothing to stop enforcers 
informing firms directly of the standards they expect, and it is clear that this is done 
outside any formal use of adverse publicity. But adverse publicity may help to bring 
home that message forcefully and clearly. As noted above, the OFT has stated that when 
it publicises details of its actions, such as litigation and undertakings, it takes account of 
the need to increase consumers’ awareness of their rights, educate other businesses, 
and facilitate complaints about further breaches. This educational role of adverse 
publicity is important. Publicity may focus on a particular trader (for example following 
successful enforcement action) but may also be used to draw the attention of the public 
to more systemic problems within a sector, perhaps as part of a wider campaign. The 
FSA has explained that when it issues press releases, it is making a statement about 
inter alia what it finds unacceptable and what ‘consumers and firms should be alert to.’ 
It might be argued that if traders are to have a better picture of what is and what is not 
acceptable, it would be appropriate to publish details even when a trader is found to be 
in compliance. The Advertising Standards Authority publishes details of all its 
adjudications for this reason.86 
 
Adverse publicity as information: raising the standing of the enforcer 
Adverse publicity may raise the profile and standing of the enforcer. Rourke observes 
that agencies use publicity ‘as an avenue through which the public may be acquainted – 
                                                 
84 LBRO/OFT Civil Sanctions Pilot (OFT 1296) December 2010. 
85 OFT above n 20, para 1.22. 
86 See Brooker above n 73, p 16 
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or more than acquainted – with the objectives and achievements of executive 
agencies.’87 If the enforcer’s aim were merely to persuade consumers to think highly of it 
then this would be a cause for concern. However, if adverse publicity helps consumers to 
understand the context of enforcement, that would appear desirable. When examining 
food hygiene disclosure, Van Erp identifies an aim of such regimes as accountability, 
arguing that informing the public about the activities of an enforcement authority 
improves the image of the authority and, and as result, aids compliance.88 Similarly, the 
Chairman of the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission accepts that an aim 
of adverse publicity is to enhance the transparency and accountability of his 
organisation’s work.89 As noted above, adverse publicity might help to educate 
consumers, not just about the firm in question, but about common problems within a 
sector.90 
 
PART THREE: RE-CONCEIVING ADVERSE PUBLICITY 
The risks and rewards of adverse publicity 
The discussion above has outlined the role of adverse publicity as sanction and 
information tool, while recognising that the distinction between these is imperfect. It is 
important now to draw the themes from the discussion above, and to consider how the 
concerns may be addressed.  
 
The article has identified deterrence and compliance as the principal aims of adverse 
publicity when examined through the lens of sanctioning. Adverse publicity should deter 
traders from deciding to engage in wrongdoing (broadly interpreted) and incentivise 
them to take precautions to avoid unintentionally producing the harm that would lead to 
such publicity. There is some evidence that regulatory offences are not always taken 
                                                 
87 Rourke above n 28 at 231. 
88 J van Erp “Effects of Disclosure on Business Compliance: a Framework for the Analysis of Disclosure 
Regimes” (2007) 5 European Food and Feed Law Review 255.  
89 A Fels “Australia’s Competition Regulator and the Media” cited in Yeung,above n 10, at 3. 
90 Brooker above n 73 p 10. 
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seriously, either by the perpetrators or by the public.91 While this is probably because of 
the very low formal sanctions that are typically imposed, it may also be because 
relatively little stigma attaches to their commission. There is also evidence that 
consumers do not always take what might be described as social and ethical matters into 
account when making purchasing decisions. While these are of concern, they may be 
overstated. There seems little doubt that firms take negative publicity very seriously, 
and there is evidence that some forms of adverse publicity are likely to have a significant 
impact upon consumer decision-making.92  
 
Of more concern is the argument that adverse publicity may operate disproportionately 
as a penalty, particularly because it is so difficult to control. Coffee describes it as 
‘something of a loose cannon’, arguing that ‘its exact impact cannot be reliably 
estimated nor is it controllable so that only the guilty are affected.’ He concludes that ‘it 
seems easier to rely on even cash fines in preference to the wholly unpredictable impact 
of a legal stigma.’93 Whitman also notes the potential for adverse publicity to be 
disproportionate, suggesting that ‘once the state stirs up public opprobrium against an 
offender it cannot really control the way the public treats that offender.’ He thereby 
concludes that this risks conferring ‘too much enforcement power on a fickle and 
uncontrolled general populace’.94 More recently, the Better Regulation Task Force raised 
concerns about the potential for adverse publicity to operate unfairly.95 
 
There are difficulties balancing the deterrent value of adverse publicity with the need for 
sanctioning to be proportionate. Yeung suggests that publicity is likely to aid deterrence, 
                                                 
91 Borrie argued that fines are sometimes viewed by traders as “tiresome pinpricks, minor inconveniences that 
are shrugged off and the fines put down as a business expense.” Gordon Borrie The Development of Consumer 
Law and Policy – Bold Spirits and Timorous Souls (London: Stevens and Stevens, 1984) p 56. 
92 See below. 
93 John C Coffee Jr “No Soul to damn no Body to kick” An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of 
Corporate Punishment” (1981) 79 Mich L Rev 386, at 427-428. 
94 Whitman cited in Yeung, above n 10, at 40. 
95 Better Regulation Task Force Avoiding Regulatory Creep (Cabinet Office, 2004). 
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but that this may come at the expense of proportionality.96 Van Erp also emphasises 
fairness and proportionality, but she notes practical, as well as ideological, objections to 
any excess stigma that arises from adverse publicity. Where any form of sanctioning is 
excessive there is a danger that it will produce defiance.97 The sense of grievance is 
likely to be particularly great where the media sensationalises the story, or its 
significance is otherwise misconstrued or exaggerated by the public. Any such defiance 
will make the regulator’s task of securing compliance particularly difficult.98  
 
By contrast, Fisse and Braithwaite argue that to assume that the impact of a sanction 
must be finite and proportionate to the relevant offence is false: ‘the most that is 
required to satisfy the principle of proportionality is formal proportionate quantification of 
sentence in advance, irrespective of the degree of impact upon an offender.’99 This 
seems a weak defence. If the effect of an enforcer’s conduct is disproportionate to any 
wrongdoing, then it should consider forbearance. However, adverse publicity may result 
from a trader being sanctioned without that publicity being sought by the enforcer. Some 
publicity is inevitable, and this may not accurately reflect the degree of culpability on 
behalf of the trader. The advantage of having the enforcer control adverse publicity is 
that it helps to manage the way that publicity results and thus guards against 
disproportionality. The use of the internet to shape reputations raises particular concern. 
Rumour and conjecture may do significant damage to traders, and this may not be easily 
undone. At its most serious, traders may be subjected to a form of ‘brand 
assassination.’100 Fairness may lead us to a regime which carefully considers and 
controls how information is communicated. As Brooker comments ‘[o]fficial comment 
                                                 
96 Yeung above n 10 at 41-42. 
97 Van Erp, above n 88 at 6. The author illustrates this with the example of the several hundred employees and 
proprietors of Chinese restaurants in Rotterdam who protested against what they saw as disproportionate action 
by the Food Safety Authority. 
98 See e.g. AA Painter “Why Prosecute?” (1974) British Food Journal 38. 
99 Fisse and Braithwaite above n 10 p 310. 
100 The Economist “The blog in the corporate machine” 9 February 2006. Cited in Brooker above n 73 p 19. 
Note also the concern about websites such as Trip Advisor. 
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from regulators is surely preferable to the rumour mill.’101 The question is not whether 
negative publicity should be generated. Instead, the focus should be on (a) how it might 
be generated; and (b) how it can best be managed.  
 
Another concern is whether adverse publicity is helpful when so much enforcement 
activity is informal and based upon compliance strategies. The emphasis on compliance 
is striking in consumer protection law, and there will be a limited role for adverse 
publicity as part of a compliance regime. However, while that role may be limited, it will 
nevertheless be important. Compliance strategies take place against the background of 
the threat of sanctioning. Given the potential for adverse publicity to operate as a 
deterrent it has a role in a regime that emphasises compliance. However, there is 
concern that compliance strategies depend upon the existence of trust and co-operation 
between regulator and regulated. Where traders fear that regulators will be too ready to 
generate adverse publicity, they may be reticent to disclose evidence of wrongdoing. The 
powers being tested by the Civil Sanctions Pilot will be influential here. It seems likely 
that the existence of sanctioning tools will be sufficient to persuade many traders to do 
as the enforcer’s request, and this is likely to involve either the enforcer, or the trader, 
publicising the latter’s actions. 
 
When examining adverse publicity as information, a number of concerns are evident. 
First, many consumers will not use the information disclosed, even where it appears 
objectively useful. In addition, it is difficult to decide what to disclose. Disclosing that a 
trader has breached consumer protection law is relatively straightforward, but rather 
narrow. Brooker favours disclosure ‘when a regulator, or other organisation in the 
regulatory framework, has imposed a formal sanction (as stipulated by Macrory) or has 
failed to meet acceptable performance standards.’102 This approach is justified on a 
number of bases. First, in these circumstances, the facts will all have been considered 
                                                 
101 Brooker above n 73, p 10. 
102 Ibid, p 15. 
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and a decision will have been made that the firm is not in compliance. Secondly, a clear 
process will have been followed to reach this point. Thirdly, the organisation making the 
decision is part of the regulatory system and so is accountable for that decision.103 By 
disclosing in such circumstances, stakeholders should be confident that appropriate 
procedures have been followed. There are attractions to this approach, particularly 
where a formal sanction has been imposed. Disclosing where traders have failed to meet 
‘acceptable performance standards’ is more problematic, as the term is potentially very 
broad. Some regulators are specifically empowered to disclose such information. For 
example, the Utilities Act 2000 placed a duty on Energywatch to provide consumers with 
information about overall performance while the Water Act 2003 required the Consumer 
Council for Water to publish statistical information about complaints.104 Other 
organisations, such as the Financial Services Authority and the Food Standards Agency, 
are subject to a public interest test. However, there is evidence that some enforcement 
authorities felt prohibited from disclosing information by part nine of the Enterprise Act. 
While there was some reason to show caution, research has concluded that regulatory 
practice was rather more cautious that was required by the legislation.105 It should be 
noted that under the RES Act, enforcers will be required to publish details of any 
enforcement action, such as where a civil sanction is imposed or an undertaking 
accepted. The Guidance to the Act suggests that enforcers might append a list of cases 
taken in an annual report or maintain a database of sanctioning decisions taken. 106 
While this does not restrict other publicity options available such as the issuing of press 
releases, it may signal a move towards more systematic reporting of enforcement action.  
 
Adverse publicity and positive publicity: towards an optimal balance 
It is vital that where consumers are invited to act upon adverse publicity, whether it is 
presented as a sanction or merely as information, they are able to see that information 
                                                 
103 Ibid. 
104 Ibid, p 19 for discussion. 
105 Ibid pp 14-15. 
106 BERR Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008 Guidance to the Act (July 2008) para 71. 
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in context. This is particularly important where the trader may not have been found in 
breach of the law. It might involve providing additional textual information, or presenting 
more comprehensive information about all traders, and not just those who fall foul of the 
law or who display poor performance. Just as consumers want to be able draw 
appropriate adverse conclusions about traders, so they want to be able to draw 
appropriate positive conclusions about them. One model is to provide objective 
information about all firms within a given category, thus allowing consumers to draw 
appropriate inferences. This might be achieved by tables of all firms within a sector 
which show objective data and enable consumers to make comparisons. Such tables 
provide compelling incentives for firms to score highly on the relevant criteria. Two very 
recent developments are particularly interesting here.  
 
PUBLISHING DETAILS OF COMPLAINTS AGAINST FINANCIAL SERVICES FIRMS 
In January 2010 the FSA announced that it would require firms that receive 500 or more 
complaints over a 6 month period to publish twice yearly: how many complaints they 
have opened and closed, the percentage closed within eight weeks and the percentage of 
complaints upheld.107 These firms generate approximately 95 per cent of the complaints 
reported to the FSA. Firms present this information under five areas: banking, home 
finance, general insurance and pure protection, life and pensions, and investments. The 
FSA publishes both aggregate and firm-level data on its website.108 The FSA’s director of 
conduct policy argues that this greater transparency helps consumers to make better-
informed decisions by presenting a picture of how firms handle complaints while also 
giving firms clear incentives to improve. 109  
                                                 
107 The FSA defines a complaint as: “any oral or written expression of dissatisfaction, whether justified or not, 
about the firm's provision of (or failure to provide) a financial service which alleges that the customer has 
suffered (or may suffer) financial loss, material distress or material inconvenience.” Firms are not obliged to 
report complaints that are resolved to the customer’s satisfaction by the close of the business day after the 
complaint was made. 
108 See http://www.fsa.gov.uk/Pages/Library/Other_publications/commentary/index.shtml accessed 8-10-10. 
109 For the background to the FSA’s thinking on transparency see FSA above n 59. 
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Principle six of the FSA’s ‘Principles for Businesses’ requires each firm to ‘pay due regard 
to the interests of its customers and treat them fairly.’ A report for the FSA identified 
certain principles which reflected the consumer perspective on fairness. Among those 
were ‘do your best to resolve mistakes as quickly as possible’ and ‘do not take 
advantage of the customer’. The report also found a view that ‘providers are quick to 
charge customers for their mistakes but less ready to pay out in recognition of their own 
errors.’110 Other studies have suggested how fairness in the firm-consumer relationship 
might be conceived, with redress again looming large.111 Against this background, the 
publication of complaints data may be used as a proxy indicator of fairness.  
It is clear that the FSA intends consumers to use this information in choosing firms. It 
should be viewed alongside the publication by the Financial Ombudsman Service of 
complaints with which it deals, as the FOS receives complaints only after consumers 
have not been able to obtain satisfaction from a firm. The combined information provides 
a helpful indication of how firms deal with complaints. Given that this is something which 
matters to consumers, it will assist them in making informed choices as well as providing 
compelling incentives on firms to improve. There is some evidence of the media picking 
up the data and, in some cases, displaying it prominently.112 
 
THE NATIONAL FOOD HYGIENE RATINGS SCHEME 
A variation on the initiative above is to use some form of certification as an indicator of 
quality. The Food Hygiene Ratings Scheme (‘the Scheme’) is an initiative of the Food 
Standards Agency and local authorities which aims to ‘help consumers choose where to 
                                                 
110 FSA Treating Customers Fairly: The Consumers’ View (FSA Consumer Research 38, June 2005) p 37. 
111 See e.g. P Cartwright “Conceptualising and Understanding Fairness: Lessons for and from Financial 
Services” in M. Kenny, J.Devenney and L. Fox O’Mahony (eds) Unconscionability in European Private 
Financial Transactions: Protecting the Vulnerable (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) 205 at pp 
222-225.The FSA’s Consumer Protection Strategy also seeks to ensure that consumers receive prompt and 
effective redress. 
112 See e.g. Daily Mirror “Food hygiene inspectors shut down own canteen over bugs and 'bad practices': 
http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/weird-world/2010/09/02/food-hygiene-inspectors-shut-down-own-canteen-
115875-22530686/#ixzz1FMaupNnG  (last visited 29-2-11). 
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eat out or shop for food” by giving them information about the hygiene standards in food 
outlets.’113  
 
Food hygiene ratings are based upon an assessment by a local authority food safety 
officer of: how hygienically food is handled; the condition and structure of the buildings; 
and how the business manages and records its food safety activities. Handling covers 
matters such as the preparation, cooking, and storing of food. When examining the 
buildings, the officer will look at issues such as cleanliness and ventilation. The business 
then receives an overall rating on a scale from 0 to 5. When the Scheme was first 
developed, it was referred to as a ‘Scores on the Doors Scheme.’ While memorable, this 
could be criticised, particularly because there is no power to require firms to display the 
results on their doors, or, indeed, anywhere else. Businesses are merely encouraged to 
display stickers or certificates containing details of the where consumers can see them. 
 
The Hampton Report had emphasised the role of positive incentives in securing 
compliance, and urged the Better Regulation Executive to encourage regulators to adopt 
positive incentives schemes.114 The Scheme provides a compelling incentive for firms to 
improve their hygiene ratings so that they can advertise this. It is clear that consumers 
take food hygiene very seriously, with a snap shot survey carried our recently for the 
FSA indicating that 8 per cent of consumers regard hygiene standards to be extremely 
important when eating out. Those interviewed used proxy indicators of hygiene such as 
appearance (both of staff and the establishment) to make decisions. In the words of the 
FSA’s Chairman ‘we wanted to give people the ability to judge for themselves whether 
they considered the hygiene standards of a food outlet to be good enough.’115 
 
The Scheme offers a glimpse of how reputation may be used as a tool of consumer 
protection policy. It has certain clear attractions. First, it provides information on quality 
                                                 
113 http://www.food.gov.uk/news/newsarchive/2010/aug/fhrs 
114 Hampton above n 4, recommendation 11. 
115 FSA “National Food Hygiene Scheme Launched” (30th November 2010). 
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which a large proportion of consumers state is relevant to their decision-making. 
Secondly, rather than focusing solely on information that impacts negatively upon a 
trader, it also provides positive information that will reassure consumers. In so doing, it 
provides a very clear incentive upon traders to make food hygiene as a matter of 
priority. While the media are likely to pick up on poor scores, consumers are able to 
search for traders with higher ratings. The Scheme is likely, therefore, to operate both 
as a sanction and as an informational tool. 
 
An obvious limitation of the Scheme is that as there is no compulsion on traders to 
disclose ratings, only those who score highly will publicise these ratings.116 The ratings of 
all firms will be available, but only online. It is likely that tables of food outlets will be 
compiled, and so information will become more readily available. However, in this 
respect it compares unfavourably with schemes such as the Restaurant Hygiene Quality 
Cards system which was established in Los Angeles County in 1997. The Los Angeles 
scheme required restaurants to publicise in their front windows the grade that reflected 
inspection findings. It has been stated that in the Scheme: ‘a restaurant’s grade is 
available when users need it, at the time when they make a decision about entering the 
establishment; where they need it, at the location where purchase of a meal will take 
place; and in a format that makes complex information quickly comprehensible.’117 There 
is evidence that those restaurants with high grades received increases in revenue, while 
those with low grades suffered. In addition, research found a reduction in 
hospitalisations as a result of food-related illnesses as a result of increases in the quality 
of hygiene. 118 According to Weil et al: ‘more informed choices by consumers appear to 
                                                 
116 Requiring businesses to disclose their ratings on the premises would require legislation. 
117 Weil, Fung, Graham and Fagotto above n 5 at 169. See also JE Fielding, A Aquirre, MA Spear and LE Frias 
“Making the grade: Changing the incentives in retail food establishment inspection” (1999)(17) American 
Journal of Preventative Medicine 243. 
118 See GZ Jin and P Leslie “The effect of information on product quality: Evidence from restaurant hygiene 
grade cards” (2003) 118 Quarterly Journal of Economics 409 and PA Simon P. Leslie G Run GZ Jin R Reporter 
A Aguirre and JE Fielding “Impact of restaurant hygiene grade cards on foodborne disease hospitalizations in 
Los Angeles County” (2005) 67(7) Journal of Environmental Health 32. 
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have improved hygiene practices, rewarded restaurants with good grades, and 
generated economic incentives that stimulated competition among restaurants.’119 
 
In the UK Scheme, traders can ask for an additional inspection where they can 
demonstrate that they have taken steps to improve the matters that led to the initial 
rating. Commentators have long championed that where firms improve their 
performance, this should be celebrated. Fisse and Braithwaite see some role for what 
they describe as ‘ceremonial reintegration.’ Just as a failure to react appropriately to 
transgression would justify adverse publicity, so would an appropriate response deserve 
praise: ‘if they [traders] come up with an exemplary performance, their virtue should be 
announced by the court as a reward.’120 This is discussed in the context of court-based 
publicity sanctions, and it is not clear that such an approach would be appropriate under 
the National Food Hygiene Rating Scheme. Nevertheless, there has been an emphasis on 
traders being able to demonstrate publically that they have addressed the non-
compliance that led to the earlier rating. This also guards against the potential for the 
Scheme to operate disproportionately. 
 
It is too early to tell how successful the consumer complaints and Food Hygiene Rating 
schemes will be. Their rationale has been warmly greeted in some quarters. For 
example, it has been suggested that ‘by providing consumers with independent 
information about quality indicators – such as compliance rates or upheld complaints – 
our regulatory institutions can help to square the virtuous circle and promote consumer 
power.’121 The Food Hygiene Ratings Scheme in particular is to be welcomed as an 
information tool, given the way in which it provides information which is of considerable 
interest to consumers in a clear and readily understandable manner. It also provides 
significant incentives to traders to take steps to improve their hygiene. The publication of 
                                                 
119 Weil, Fung, Graham and Fagotto above n 5 at169. 
120 Fisse and Braithwaite above n 10, p 308. 
121 Brooker above n 73 p 13. 
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complaints data is less compelling as an information tool. The information is more 
difficult for consumers to understand, and firms can legitimately claim that it might in 
some cases provide a misleading picture of the firm’s treatment of consumers. 
Nevertheless, as a way of incentivising firms to improve their complaints handling, there 
is no doubt that it plays a role.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
It is inevitable that traders will sometimes act in a way that generates adverse publicity. 
Where their conduct receives the attention of enforcers, those authorities have to 
consider how they will use such publicity to achieve regulatory objectives. In the context 
of consumer protection, adverse publicity may be used in two principal ways. First, it 
may be used as or alongside a sanction, as part of the enforcement process. It has 
potential to operate as a compelling deterrent, and while there are concerns that it may 
potentially operate in a disproportionate manner, if it is carefully managed, it should 
incentivise traders to meet the requirements of the regimes under which they operate. 
Secondly, adverse publicity may be used to attempt to correct the information 
asymmetry that exists between traders and consumers. Publicising sanctions imposed on 
traders helps to inform consumers about definable and potentially significant matters, 
such as the trader’s wrongdoing, the standards the enforcer expects and, where 
appropriate, the action that a consumer should take to obtain redress. Publicising social 
and ethical matters and performance standards is more problematic, particularly where 
that conduct does not fall foul of the law. There is a danger that consumers will not see 
the information is context and that the publicity will either be unfair to traders, or 
unhelpful to consumers.  
 
The recent initiatives by the Financial Services Authority and the Food Standards Agency 
reveal how it is possible to develop regimes which inform consumers and raise 
standards. While neither is perfect, they demonstrate how adverse publicity may be 
generated alongside more favourable information in a manner that consumers can use. 
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At a time when there is a determination to provide more responsive and flexible forms of 
regulation, and to respect and bolster consumer sovereignty, the case for using adverse 
publicity is compelling. 
 
 
 
 
